Knowledge as a Mental State? A Study on Oxford Realism

• Ngôn ngữ: eng
• ISBN: 2515
• ISBN-13: 978-3832525156
• Thông tin xuất bản: Berlin Logos Verlag Berlin, 2010
• Mô tả vật lý: 1 online resource (136 p.)
• Bộ sưu tập: Tài liệu truy cập mở
• ID: 460593
• Chủ đề: 1. Erkenntnistheorie; 2. Harold Arthur Prichard; 3. John Cook Wilson; 4. John Langshaw Austin; 5. Wissen; 6. Philosophy

Tóm tắt

Subject of this book is an epistemological consideration concerning the nature of knowledge. But other than the most essays on the subject of knowledge, here I am going to deal with a largely overlooked account to try to find an answer to the question of knowledge. This is the mental state account of knowledge. Or to put it into the main question: is knowledge a mental state? Now, the question is: Why is the epistemic thinking of Cook Wilson, Prichard and Austin afflicted with such ignorance in contemporary epistemic discussions? The answer is: an unreflected Platonian heritage during 2000 years of epistemic thinking -- a notion which is similar to a point Hetherington has called ``epistemic absolutism''. So my main conclusion here is: the JTB thesis (knowledge is some aspect of justified true belief) is insufficient in order to give an account of the nature of knowledge. A consequence from this is: all the epistemic theories which are dealing with the JTB thesis are based on deficient assumptions. Hence their results -- notably the well-known externalism/internalism debate - are insufficient, too. So, there is a need for a new theory of knowledge based on the MS thesis.